In a seminal article, Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) proposed that causal explanation should be viewed from the perspective of a constraint satisfaction process, in which people choose a cause among several alternative explanations that is the most coherent with the events to be explained. On the basis of Thagard's (1989 Thagard's ( , 1992 theory of explanatory coherence, they put forward four principles that underlie the coherence of social explanations: Perceivers should prefer the explanation that accounts for most of the evidence (breadth) , that is most parsimonious (simplicity), and that is explained by other causes (being explained). Moreover, the strength of an explanation also depends on the availability of alternative explanations (competition) . This latter principle is akin to the discounting principle (Kelley, 1971a ). Read and Marcus-Newhall focused on Thagard's theory not only because it provided a broad account of explanatory coherence that incorporated these four principles, but also because the key idea of coherence could be implemented by means of a constraint satisfaction connectionist program (ECHO; Thagard, 1989 Thagard, , 1992 derived from recent work on connectionist modeling (e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988) . In a series of studies, Read and Marcus-Newhall found not only strong empirical support for Thagard's four principles of coherence, but were also able to closely simulate participants' explanatory ratings with the ECHO constraint satisfaction program.
The constraint satisfaction perspective has strongly influenced the way in which social judgment processes have been conceptualized in recent years for a variety of phenomena, including not only causal explanation, but also person perception (Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Read & Miller, 1993) , cognitive dissonance (Shultz & Lepper, 1996) , and attitude change (Spellman & I am grateful to D. Van Rooy for his helpful suggestions on earlier versions of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Frank Van Overwalle, Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussel, Belgium. Electronic mail may be sent to Frank. VanOverwalle @ vub.ac.be. 312 Holyoak, 1992; Spellman, Ullman, & Holyoak, 1993 ; for a review, see Read & Miller, in press ). Despite this broad theoretical impact, the question remains as to whether explanatory coherence and its underlying principles (Thagard, 1992) are best conceptualized as a constraint satisfaction process, or whether alternative theoretical models are possible or even preferable. There are indeed several important shortcomings in the ECHO constraint satisfaction model that cast doubt on its usefulness as a theoretical tool to analyze causal explanation processes. In the following sections, I discuss these shortcomings, propose an alternative connectionist framework that shows more promise as a model of causal explanation, and test it on Read and Marcus-Newhall's (1993) data.
Shortcomings of ECHO
Before discussing ECHO's shortcomings, I first briefly describe the major characteristics of ECHO as used by Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) to model social explanation. Input information about possible causes and events activates a host of concepts that are organized in a loose heterogeneous network. The links or connections between these concepts are either excitatory so that the activation of one concept increases the activation of another, or inhibitory so that the activation of one concept decreases the activation of another. Inhibitory links occur when concepts are inconsistent with one another, such as when explanations are mutually inconsistent. Activation is automatically spread through all the connections in the network during a number of iterative cycles, until the network converges at a stable solution that is the best compromise among the constraints imposed by the excitatory and inhibitory connections (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988; Thagard, 1989b Thagard, , 1992 . By this process, concepts that are not supported die out, and concepts that are supported are strengthened. The most highly activated explanatory concept represents the most plausible explanation up to that point. Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) claimed that ECHO, in addition to the four principles of explanatory coherence, could also account for several classic attributional phenomena such as discounting and augmentation (Kelley, 1971a) . However, they did not mention what most social and cognitive researchers regard as the most central test of causality, notably, the principle of covariation (e.g., Kelley, 1967) or contingency (see Allen, 1993; Shanks, 1993 , for reviews). The covariation or contingency principle specifies that a cause is that condition that is always present when the effect is present and that is always absent when the effect is absent (Kelley, 1967) . In the attribution literature, there is considerable agreement that the degree of cause-effect covariation directly determines the perceived strength or influence of an explanation when only a single cause is involved. Several experiments in the social and cognitive domain have demonstrated that humans are very susceptible to cause-effect covariation when given sufficient information (see Shanks, 1995 , for a discussion). Although the covariation principle is sometimes complicated by additional mechanisms (such as discounting) when multiple possible causes are considered, even then covariation remains a necessary condition for a cause to play some explanatory role (Allen, 1993; Schanks, 1993) .
The degree of covariation is often specified in a probabilistic formulation (e.g., Allen, 1993; Cheng & Novick, 1990 ) that is closely related to statistical measures of contingency such as chi-square, and has therefore received normative status. Both the probabilistic and chi-square measure vary between -1 (perfect negative covariation) and +1 (perfect positive covariation), with 0 indicating no covariation. Any model of causal thinking that claims psychological plausibility should converge to a solution that closely replicates these normative values. However, it can be demonstrated by simulation and mathematical proof that ECHO is insensitive to the true covariation between a single cause and the effect (see Appendix). Thagard (1989) admitted that an approach that takes probabilistic norms into consideration "does not seem applicable to the cases of explanatory coherence I have been considering" (p. 458). To illustrate, in the most simple case with one causal hypothesis, ECHO sometimes predicts a positive explanatory activation even when the true covariation is positive, zero, or negative; the same is true for negative explanatory activations (see Appendix). Hence, although ECHO accumulates most activation for the best explanation, it fails to indicate how good or plausible the chosen explanation actually is. This is, in my view, a fatal shortcoming of ECHO, one that makes it inadequate as a model of causal explanation.
Another serious shortcoming of the ECHO model is that the connections that reflect causal relationships between the different concepts in the network are imposed by the experimenter and do not grow as a result of a learning process (Chi, 1989; Gabrys & Lesgold, 1989; Smith, 1996) . As admitted by Thagard (1989) , "explanatory coherence theory does not address the question of how people form these kinds of [causal] hypotheses" (p. 460). Most constraint satisfaction approaches assume that some other interpretative process must actually set up the network, as with earlier associative models of social cognition (e.g., Hamilton, Driscoll, & Worth, 1989) . Consequently, the phenomena that are modeled in ECHO reflect only the response phase during which a causal judgment is made and omit the more interesting learning phase in which causes and effects are observed and experienced and connections between concepts are developed.
This can lead to psychological anomalies. To illustrate, take the phenomenon of discounting (Kelley, 1971 a) . When a person learns, for instance, that an allergic reaction took place after eating one particular product, then the other suspected foods will be discounted as the cause of the allergy. Although ECHO can correctly predict this phenomenon, it can do so only by requiring that the true cause is simultaneously active together with the discounted causes, because the true cause (e.g., allergic food) must suppress the potential activation of the other foods. When the true cause is not simultaneously active (e.g., when the allergic product is not served), however, then the model incorrectly predicts that the previously discounted foods will again accumulate explanatory power. This seems very implausible psychologically, because individuals seem to come to learn that most food products are safe without necessarily thinking concurrently about the products they are allergic to. More generally, people often believe that a certain factor (e.g., the cock's crow) is not responsible for an effect (e.g., sunrise), without necessarily considering or even remembering the true alternative cause (e.g., the earth's spin). Thus, ECHO can handle only momentary discounting because the connections of the discounted causes are never adjusted. To avoid such implausible predictions, a connectionist model of causality must include a mechanism by which the strength of the connections between causes and effects are adjusted as the result of a learning experience.
Another limitation of ECHO is that it cannot deal efficiently with conjunctions of different explanations because Thagard (1989b) believed that "composite propositions do not, in general, figure in explanations" (p. 464) and viewed "the problem of the acceptability of conjunctions as unsolved and beyond the scope of the theory of explanatory coherence" (Thagard, 1989a, p. 495) . This position stands in sharp contrast with the widely accepted idea in attribution theory that conjunctions have a meaning and function that clearly differs from individual causes (e.g., Cheng & Novick, 1990; Kelley, 1971b) . For example, an unusual event (e.g., a brilliant student failing an exam) often needs to be explained by a combination of multiple causes (e.g., lack of preparation, illness, difficulty of the subject, and so on) because none of the individual causes can sufficiently explain the event (Kelley, 1971b) . As a test of the principles of coherence, however, Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) invited their participants to estimate conjunctions of explanations. In the ECHO simulations, such conjunctive explanations were treated as cohypotheses that together explained the event. As such, individual explanations and conjunctions cannot be simulated simultaneously within one network, but must be simulated by two slightly different networks. This leads to the anomalous prediction that perceivers are aware either of single explanations or of conjunctions, but not of both. Because two different networks are needed to run the simulations, this can also lead to the implausible consequence that some explanatory concepts can receive two different activation levels.
Alternative Feedforward Connectionist Model
Over the past decade, another line of cognitive research on human causality judgments (for reviews, see Allen, 1993; Shanks, 1993 Shanks, , 1995 has revealed that causality can be profitably studied from the framework of two-layer feedforward connectionist networks, by using the Widrow-Hoff or delta learning algorithm (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988) . This learning algorithm is identical to the Rescorla-Wagner (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) formulation of animal conditioning and has also been applied in human learning and categorization (see Gluck & Bower, 1988b; Shanks, 1991a; Van Overwalle & Van Rooy, in press ). This provides the feedforward connectionist perspective with a strong philogenetic origin and an extensive research base from which social researchers can draw a lot of interesting data.
Perhaps most important, several researchers have mathematically demonstrated that given sufficient learning experiences, the Rescorla-Wagner learning algorithm always converges to the probabilistic norm of covariation (see Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Van Overwalle, 1996) . Thus, unlike ECHO, feedforward models are sensitive to actual cause-effect covariation. The same learning algorithm is also capable of predicting lasting effects of discounting and augmentation (in the animal learning literature known as blocking and conditioned inhibition respectively; see Van Overwalle & Van Rooy, in press) , rather than the short-lived response effects simulated by ECHO. Accessible reviews of cognitive learning theories and research on human causal judgments can be found in Allen (1993), Shanks ( 1993 Shanks ( , 1995 , and Van Overwalle and Van Rooy (in press).
Given that the feedforward approach can predict classical principles of attribution, a crucial question that arises is the extent to which this approach can also account for the four principles of explanatory coherence set out by Thagard (1989b Thagard ( , 1992 and tested by Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) . Before one can accept the present feedforward proposal, it must be shown that it performs at least equally well on the principles of explanatory coherence that were so well captured by the ECHO constraint satisfaction network. Before turning to some model simulations that explore this question (see next sections), a brief introduction into the feedforward network model and its major differences with the ECHO constraint satisfaction model is in order. To facilitate this exposition, I make use of a concrete scenario (about Cheryl) from the experiments by Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) that will also be used in my simulations.
The scenarios in Read and Marcus-Newhall's (1993) experiments included several different events to explain, events that were chosen so that, taken alone, each event had a very good explanation (narrow explanation). However, taken as a group, the events were better explained by a different explanation (broad explanation). For example, in the Cheryl scenario, an upset stomach was best explained by the (narrow) explanation that Cheryl had a stomach virus, weight gain was best explained by the (narrow) explanation that she had stopped exercising, and feeling tired was best explained by the (narrow) explanation that she had mononucleosis. However, all events together were better explained by the (broad) explanation that she was pregnant. Another possible explanation was the conjunction of all narrow explanations (conjoint explanation). Figure 1 depicts how the Cheryl scenario can be represented by an ECHO network (panel a) and by a two-layer feedforward network (panel b). The major similarities and differences between the two network approaches can be distinguished roughly at two levels: architecture and processing mechanism.
Architecture
As can be seen in Figure 1 , the general architecture of the two networks is very similar. This simply follows from the fact that both networks encode the same information given the same assumption that each concept is represented by a single node (i.e., localist encoding). The top layer of each network includes nodes that represent the events, whereas the bottom layer reflects nodes that represent potential explanations. Both layers are linked by means of connections between events and explanations. However, an obvious difference in the architecture between the two networks is that Read and Marcus-Newhall's (1993) version of ECHO does not explicitly include nodes for conjunctions of explanations, whereas this can be easily incorporated in the feedforward network (not all possible conjunctions and their connections are depicted, however, to avoid clutter in the figure) . A feedforward network that combines single causes (or cues) and conjunctions (or configurations) is termed a configural-cue network (Gluck & Bower, 1988a) . Another difference is that activation does not flow in the same manner in the two networks. In ECHO, activation is spread in all directions (cf. bidirectional arrows), whereas in a feedforward network, activation is typically unidirectionally spread from the input (causal) nodes to the output (event) nodes.
Processing Mechanism
There are, however, important differences in the dynamics by which information is processed through the network. Perhaps the most crucial difference is how the strength of the connections is determined. In both networks the strength or quality of an explanation is reflected in the weight of the connections; however, this weight is acquired in a different way. In ECHO, the connection weights are fixed and determined a priori. For example, on the basis of their participants' causal probability ratings, Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) imposed the strongest connections between the narrow explanations and their corresponding target events, weaker connections between the broad explanations and all events, and no connections for explanations that were irrelevant with respect to some events. Such different weights are indicated by different proportions of ECHO's default excitatory weight (see Figure la for the weights of the present simulations).
In contrast, in the feedforward network, weights are developed dynamically. Initially, all connections are possible and will eventually reach excitatory, inhibitory, or zero weight depending on the person's learning history. In general, the delta learning algorithm predicts that the more a cause and an event co-occur, the stronger their connection will grow. Consequently, giving the frequencies depicted in Figure lb , narrow explanations will end up with the strongest connections because they co-occur most often with their target event, followed by broad explanations, which co-occur somewhat less often, whereas conjunctions will acquire little strength because they co-occur least often. Thus, the specific learning history is crucial in determining how much strength the connections will acquire in the feedforward network.
To understand the processing mechanism underlying my simulations, it is important to have some insight into how the co- occurrence between causes and events determines the growth of connection strength. Hence, I now illustrate the workings of the delta learning algorithm (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988) with the aid of two examples depicted in Figure 2 .
Acquisition of Connection Strength
I begin with the simplest case, in which one cause (A) is always paired with one event (see left panel of Figure 2 ). This example will illustrate how the strength of A is incrementally acquired until the probabilistic norm of +1 (full strength; see Cheng & Novick, 1990 ) is reached.
Step 1
When cause A is present during a learning experience or trial, its input node is turned on to the default activation level + 1. All other causes that are not present have their activation turned off at level 0. The input activation of cause A is then spread automatically to the output (event) node in proportion to the weight of the connection. Because it is typically assumed that connection weights start at zero, at this point, the activation sent by A to the output node is still zero (input activation [1] x weight [0]).
Step 2 All activations from the input nodes that are received at the output node are linearly summed to determine the activation of the output node. This output activation can be understood as representing the magnitude of the event as predicted by the network on the basis of the causes present. In this case, given only cause A, the activation of the output node is simply the activation received by cause A, which is zero at this point.
Step 3 The predicted magnitude of the event or output activation is then compared with the actual occurrence of the event, which is represented by an external teaching signal that has activation level of + 1 when the event is present and 0 when the event is absent. In our example, given that the event is present, there is a large discrepancy or error between predicted outcome (output activation = 0) and actual outcome (teaching activation = 1 ), which amounts to + 1. Thus, the network at this point seriously underestimates the magnitude of the event.
Step 4 To achieve a faithful copy of reality, the feedforward network reduces this discrepancy by adjusting the weights of the connections in proportion to the magnitude of the discrepancy. When the event is underestimated, the connections are adjusted upward; when the event is overestimated, the connections are adjusted downward. The proportion by which the connections are adjusted is specified by the learning rate parameter, which typically varies between 0% and 100%. A high learning rate indicates that new information has strong priority over old information and leads to radical adjustments (e.g., when a patient immediately believes the diagnosis of a medical expert), whereas a low learning rate suggests conservative adjustments that preserve much of the knowledge acquired by old information (e.g., when people distrust new information or experiences). Specifically, if I set the learning rate to a cautious 20%, then only 20% of the discrepancy will be used to make adjustments in the connection weights. In the example, this implies that the weight of A will be incremented by 0.20, so that after the first learning trial, the connection of A will reach a weight of 0.20 (see left panel of Figure 2 ).
By cycling through Steps 1 through 4 at each trial, the weight of A will gradually increase. This process is consistent with intuitions and experimental evidence. When one notes for the first time that a particular cause and event covary, one tends to give a rather weak causal interpretation to it; however, when one's first observation is confirmed by additional co-occurrences, then one tends to give it greater causal weight (see Shanks, 1995 , for empirical evidence). As can be seen ( Figure  2 , left panel), the weight of A slowly converges towards + 1, indicating that cause A fully explains or predicts the event. In contrast, when A is no longer followed by the event (e.g., see A ° from Trial 9 onwards), then its weight will start to decrease and converge toward 0, indicating that A ° does not explain or predict the event. Thus, the network eventually learns the best weight of the connections that predict most accurately when the event will occur.
Thus, the temporary information at each learning experience is encoded in the activation of the nodes, whereas long-term causal knowledge is encoded in the connection weights. The causal or predictive strength of an explanation up to a moment is typically measured by reactivating the knowledge in these long-term connections, that is, by turning on the appropriate input nodes and reading off the resulting output activation (or the average activation of multiple output nodes if one is interested in the explanatory power of multiple events). Input nodes with a strong connection will yield high output activations, whereas input nodes with weak connections will yield low output activations. In fact, in the present network, the strengths of connections and causes are identical (see Van Overwalle & Van Rooy, in press) . It is also possible to go the other way, that is, to activate the output (event) nodes first and then to measure how much activation is received by each input node. The former forward activation mechanism seems to reflect how people provide explanations when given specific causal questions or ratings, whereas the latter backward mechanism may reflect explanations when given an open question requesting why an event occurred.
Competition and Discounting
To illustrate the principles of competition and discounting in causal learning, I now turn to a second example with two causes (right panel in Figure 2 ). In this example, cause A and B always co-occur with the event, but cause B is only present at every other (even) trial and thus co-occurs less often than A. Hence, A should be a stronger explanation for the event than B.
By applying processing Steps 1 through 4 at each trial, the two causes will incrementally acquire a substantial amount of connection strength. As expected, the strength of A increases more rapidly because it is paired more often with the event than B (see right panel). Although very similar to the previous example, one important difference is that when cause A and B are jointly present, the weighted activations from both causes are now summed to determine the output activation. Consequently, the discrepancy with the teaching activation will be smaller, which slows down learning. Moreover, at a certain moment during learning, the output activation yields an overestimation of the event (in Trial 10, the output activation summed to 1.08), resulting in a downward adjustment of the connection weights. If this goes on for several trials, the decrement is most detrimental for cause B because unlike cause A, it is never paired alone with the event, which would allow it to recover some strength. Hence, the strength of A will slowly increase at the expense of the strength of B. This whole process can be understood as if the two explanations compete for the available strength, which is limited to + 1, or the maximum magnitude of the event to explain. Because of this competition, the strongest cause tends to block the acquisition of strength by other causes, resulting in the discounting of weaker causes.
Summary
The feedforward network shows several types of processes that seem familiar. First, the co-occurrence between causes and events is encoded in memory under the form of incrementally adjusted cause-effect connections, and choosing an explanation simply involves reactivating these existing connections. These two processes seem to capture well the distinction between causal learning from direct experiences, which usually imply a slow incremental process, and routine explanations in everyday life, which are typically based on reactivated prior knowledge and hence allow a fast choice between plausible alternative explanations. Both processes may be combined, resulting in causal reasoning. Here one first considers explanations that prior knowledge tells us are most plausible, and then additional information or arguments are taken into account for a final judgment. These three seemingly different processes of causal explanations seem to originate from the same adjustment mechanism (see also Discussion section).
Second, when multiple causal candidates exist, the inherent competitive nature of weight adjustment blocks the acquisition of weaker causes in favor of stronger ones. Such discounting is common in human causality judgments, not only as part of incremental learning explored in cognitive and social research (e.g., Baker, Mercier, Vall6e-Tourangeau, Frank, & Pan, 1993; Chapman, 1991; Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Hansen & Hall, 1985; Kruglanski, Schwartz, Maides, & Hamel, 1978; Shanks, 1985; Van Overwalle & Van Rooy, in press ), but also as part of causal reasoning in the original spirit of Kelley (1971a) . Kelley proposed that prior knowledge is used to retrieve plausible explanations and that downward adjustments are made to discount the lesser plausible alternatives. As noted above, both processes can be captured by a feedforward network approach.
Third, most learning in the network occurs when the discrepancy between what is expected and what actually happens is large. This is consistent with research demonstrating that an unexplained effect (e.g., a disconfirmed expectancy or a failure; Weiner, 1985) instigates considerable attributional activity, which often leads to changes of causal beliefs.
In conclusion, in the examples, I focused on two major characteristics of the delta learning algorithm that are essential in understanding the simulations. First, more frequent cause-event co-occurrences lead to stronger causal judgments than less frequent or imperfect (i.e., when the cause is not always followed by the effect) co-occurrences. Second, simultaneously present causes compete for available strength, so that stronger causes block the acquisition of weaker ones. With these two characteristics of feedforward learning spelled out, I now turn to the simulations.
Simulating Some Principles of Explanatory Coherence
To what extent is the feedforward network model capable of modeling Thagard's (1992) novel ideas of explanatory coherence and its underlying principles? I explored this question by running simulations of the feedforward model on the data of the three studies reported by Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) , in which they sought and found empirical support for four of these principles. In the following sections, I also report simulations of ECHO (Thagard, 1992) to allow for a comparison between the two models.
An important assumption of the feedforward simulations is that participants in Read and Marcus-Newhall's experiment acquired causal knowledge through direct experience or communication by others before the experimental intervention, and merely reactivated the relevant part in their causal network on reading the scenarios (events) and potential causes. However, because it is unlikely that participants' prior knowledge always matched precisely the experimental material, it is quite possible that they accessed and used very similar experiences that did not fit exactly. I do not specify how this somewhat different knowledge might have been used and generalized to the specific questions given, because that process is not sufficiently understood. In fact, this question was also left unanswered by Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) as they did not spell out which part of the network is activated (i.e., deemed relevant) and which part is not. My aim is only to provide a schematic demonstration that it is possible to simulate Read and MarcusNewhall's empirical results under a limited set of feedforward principles, given the assumption that participants learned the most relevant elements of the experimental scenarios before the experiments took place.
Method

Scenarios
I ran the present model simulations for Read and Marcus-Newhall's (1993) first two scenarios (Cheryl & Mark) because the results of the third scenario (Joanna) were not always consistent with the predictions (p. 436, 438) or required additional ad hoc assumptions to simulate adequately (p. 441 ). As noted earlier, there were several different facts in each of the scenarios that, taken alone, had a very good narrow explanation, but taken as a whole were better explained by a broad explanation.
In the Cheryl scenario, the fact that she felt tired could be explained by mononucleosis, her weight gain could be explained by her having stopped exercising, and her upset stomach could be explained by a stomach virus. Yet these three facts together could be better explained by the broad explanation that she was pregnant. Similarly, in the Mark scenario, the fact that he received a call from the district attorney could be explained by him being a lawyer, the fact that he handled an electric problem could be explained by him being an electrician, and the fact that he had an excess of paperwork could be explained by him being an office manager. Yet these three facts together could be better explained by assuming that Mark was a police officer.
ECHO Simulations
As they intended, Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) found that each of the proposed narrow explanations for each single fact were rated by participants as better than the broad explanation. To simulate this pattern of results with ECHO, Read and Marcus-Newhall set up the simulation so that the connections between the narrow explanations and the single facts were stronger than the connections between the broad explanation and the single facts. This was done by adjusting the default weights by the probability of the explanations as reported by the participants (Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993, p. 441 ) . Similarly, to simulate the fact that conjoint explanations (all three narrow explanations combined) of single facts received much lower ratings than the other explanations, Read and Marcus-Newhall adjusted the default weights by the reported probability ratings for these conjoint explanations.
Of course, taking a part of participants' responses as input to simulate the remaining responses increased the a priori chance that the simulations will nicely fit the data but, of course, also invited suspicion that the results are very dependent on these ad hoc adjustments. Therefore, I took a more transparent and uniform approach by adjusting the weights of the connections between the single facts and each narrow explanation to 100% of the default weight, between the single facts and the broad explanations to 70% of the default weight, and between the single facts and the conjoint explanations to 10% of the default weight. Despite this different approach, the present weight adjustments resulted in simulation results that were very comparable to those reported by Read and MarcusNewhall (1993) , as the correlation between their and my simulation results was almost perfect (r = .99 over all three studies). Because Read and Marcus-Newhall did not simulate all relevant data (as these were used for the ad hoc weight adjustments), I ran a number of additional simulations with the present weight specifications to obtain simulation results for all reported ratings in all studies.
Feedforward Simulations
To simulate the same data by the feedforward network, I had to make some reasonable assumptions on the experiences of the participants, and more specific, as to the relative frequency in which each cause (either alone or in combination) co-occurred with each event. The general principle that guided these assumptions was that causes had a different probability of occurring and a different probability of covarying with the event. That is, given the present scenarios, I assumed the individual narrow and broad explanations to occur with greater frequency than the combined occurrence of explanations (e.g., having a stomach virus, mononucleosis, and stopping exercises together is less likely than having one of these problems alone). In addition, whereas the covariation between a narrow explanation and the target event was assumed to be almost perfect (e.g., a stomach virus nearly always leads to stomach problems), the broad cause was assumed to covary with all events, but to a lesser degree (e.g., pregnancy causes several symptoms that do not all typically show up in the same person at the same time).
Specifically, to vary the frequencies in the simulations, each individual cause occurred 10 times, the joint occurrence of two causes three times, and the joint occurrence of three or four causes only one time. To vary the covariation, the target event always followed whenever its specific narrow explanation was present either alone or in combination with other explanations; when the broad cause was present alone, the event followed in only 8 out of 10 cases. In all other cases, the event was absent. In addition, a bias term reflecting a constant background or context (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988) was always present and activated at each learning trial. Consistent with Gluck and Bower's (1988a) configural-cue network specification, if a combination of causes was present during a learning experience, then this was assumed to have activated both their corresponding single input nodes as well as a configural input node representing the combination. The exact pattern of a learning history is illustrated in Table 1 for the scenario of Cheryl, and is identical for the scenario of Mark.
Of course, the occurrences and covariation in the simulations were chosen so as to reflect only their relative amount, and their exact number was irrelevant with respect to the basic mechanisms at work. However, the frequencies were intentionally kept low for simplicity and to make it possible to replicate the simulations on a personal computer with standard connectionist computer packages like the pattern associator program of McClelland and Rumelhart (1988) .
Given that the exact course of the learning histories of the participants was unknown, I ran 20 simulations for each scenario with different random orders, and report on the result averaged over these 20 runs. The connection weights (wij) were updated after each experience for each cause j and each event i, to reduce the error between the predicted effect (the activation of the output node a~ 'u') and the actual effect (the teaching activation t~ ). The update of the weights (Aw0) is mathematically expressed by the delta algorithm (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988, p. 87) :
where • is the learning rate, and ti, a °u', and a) n denote the target, output, and input activations, respectively. As noted above, the input and teaching activations were set to one whenever the cause or event was present, and to zero when they were absent. The output activation was determined by the linear summation of all input activations weighted by the respective connection strengths.
To determine participants' judgment, the activation of all output nodes needed to be transformed into an integrated response. Although several complex response transformation algorithms exist in the literature on categorization (e.g., Gluck & Bower, 1988b; Estes, Campbell, Hatsopoulos, & Hurwitz, 1989) , researchers on causality (e.g., Shanks, 1991a; Baker et al., 1993) have typically assumed a simple monotonic relationship between output activation and response, without specifying what this relationship should be. Given the little consensus and empirical evidence on this matter, I simply assumed that the response is determined by the average of all output activations of the events to be explained (i.e., single output activation given a single event; the average of all three output activations given three evefits).
Global Parameters
In the ECHO simulations, I used the default parameters as specified by Thagard (1992, p. 81 ) . However, in the feedforward simulations, given the little experience with this type of data, I first ran simulations of all studies, then chose the learning rate (e = 0.15) that on average reached the highest correlation with the data.
Summary Fit
To evaluate the performance of the ECHO and feedforward simulations, I measured a summary fit by computing the overall correlation between the simulated data and the averaged ratings as reported by Read and Marcus-Newhall ( 1993; see Tables 1 & 2 of Study 1 and Table 5 of Study 2), or, if Read and Marcus-Newhall's ratings were not available, by computing the averaged ratings from the other ratings (Table 6 of Study 3) by using their procedure (p. 435).
Results
Simulation of Breadth and Simplicity (Study 1 )
Predictions and human data. The principle of breadth states that, all other things being equal, an explanatory hypothesis that. explains more facts (broad explanation) is more coherent and Note. Cell entries denote number of times the cause covaried with the event.
a Cause omitted or frequency set to zero in the without-broad-explanation version of Study 3. b Added in the higher order version of Study 2.
b
should therefore be viewed as a better explanation than an explanation that explains fewer facts (narrow explanation). To test this principle, Read and Marcus-Newhall ( 1993, Study 1 ) gave some of their participants scenarios with only one of the three single facts, whereas other participants received all three facts. They found that the narrow explanations were rated as the best explanations for each fact taken alone. Despite this pattern of results, however, participants rated the broad explanation as the best explanation for all facts together, in agreement with the principle of breadth. These results are depicted in Figure 3 (top panel). The principle of simplicity states that the simplest explanation-the one that requires the fewest assumptions--will be viewed as the best one. To test this principle, Read and MarcusNewhall (1993, Study 1) asked their participants to rate the conjunction of all three narrow explanations (conjoint explanation) in explaining all facts. In agreement with the principle of simplicity, it was found that the conjoint explanation was rated as worse than the broad explanation (see Figure 3 , top panel).
Simulations. To simulate these results with a feedforward network, I ran the single and multiple facts conditions together as if all participants experienced about the same learning history, with frequencies of causes and events as specified in the Method section. The results of the feedforward simulation, averaged across the two scenarios and the narrow causes, is shown in Figure 3 (bottom panel). To facilitate comparisons, the results of the ECHO simulation are also shown (middle panel). As can be seen, both the ECHO and feedforward simulations are consistent with the principle of breadth. Despite the fact that the narrow causes tend to be the best in explaining the single facts, the broad cause was the best explanation when all facts were taken together. The simulations achieved an adequate summary fit with the human data, a fit that was approximately equivalent for both the ECHO simulation (r = .757) and the feedforward simulation (r = .767).
Nevertheless, in the ECHO simulation, one can see some anomaly, because the single narrow causes and their conjunction cannot be simulated at once, but must be simulated in two separate runs. This leads to the somewhat awkward result that the broad explanations have two activation levels for each simulation, two levels that do not always converge nicely. This shortcoming does not exist for the feedforward simulation.
The feedforward simulation also showed a problem in that the simulated values in the single and multiple facts conditions fell right on top of each other for the broad and conjoint explanations. This was not observed in Read and Marcus-Newhall's data. Perhaps the present simple response algorithm (i.e., averaging) is responsible for this overlap. However, rather then making additional post hoc assumptions on the response algorithm to remedy this problem, I preferred to keep the present simulation results because they do not affect the principles of coherence.
I verified that the feedforward simulation was able to replicate the principle of breadth, with t tests on the simulated data of the 40 random runs of the two scenarios. (I have not reported t tests for any of the ECHO simulations because they were based on a single run.) The tests clearly confirmed the prediction that the narrow explanations were better than the broad explanation in the single fact condition; the difference was highly significant for all narrow explanations, ts(39) = 8.28-10.31, ps = 0. In contrast, as predicted, the reversed pattern was highly significant in the multiple facts condition for all narrow explanations, is(39) = 40.01-46.79, ps = 0. The feedforward mechanism underlying this result is straightforward. Whereas each narrow cause develops a strong connection with its respective target output node but not with the other output nodes (because the narrow cause always co-occurs with its target event only), the broad cause develops moderate connections with all output nodes (because it co-occurs less often, but with all events). Recall that the strength of an explanation is reflected by the output activation, which is determined by the average strength of the connections between the relevant causes and events. Hence, when explaining only one target event, the output activation given the corresponding single explanation (with strong weight) is higher than the activation given the broad explanation (with moderate weight). In contrast, when explaining all three events together, the output activation given the broad explanation (all moderate weights) is on average stronger than that of the narrow explanations (one strong and two very weak weights).
Figure 3 also shows that both the ECHO and feedforward simulations are consistent with the principle of simplicity, in that the broad explanation was better than the conjoint explanation in explaining all facts. This difference was highly significant in the feedforward simulation, t(39) = 49.64, p = 0. The mechanism underlying this result is that the frequency of the conjoint explanation was so low compared with the narrow or broad explanations that it was not able to develop much connection strength with the output nodes in comparison with the other explanations. This resulted in very weak output activations for the conjoint explanation overall.
Simulation of Being Explained (Study 2)
Predictions and human data. Thagard's principle of being explained states that an explanatory hypothesis for a set of facts will be better if it can, in turn, be further explained by a higher order explanation. To test this principle, Read and MarcusNewhall ( 1993, Study 2) provided half their participants with multiple fact scenarios that presented the goals of some actors, goals that could be interpreted as providing a higher order explanation for the broad explanation, whereas the other participants did not read about these higher order goals. For example, in the Cheryl scenario, her husband told her that he wanted children (which is most compatible with the broad pregnancy explanation). Consistent with the principle of being explained, Read and Marcus-Newhall found that participants gave higher ratings to the broad explanation when the higher order explanation was provided than when it was absent (see Figure 5 , top panel).
Simulations. Causal learning with a higher order (goal) explanation can be easily integrated into the previous feedforward network by adding another, smaller two-layer network below it, resulting in a three-layer network architecture (see Figure 4) . The top network is similar to the first simulation and the novel bottom network consists of a higher order goal (e.g., husband wants children) at the input layer, connected with the broad cause (e.g., pregnancy) at the output layer. All other characteristics of this bottom network are identical to the top network.
Whenever the higher order goal co-occurs with the broad explanation, their connection strength is increased. After this adjustment, the activation received at the broad cause is then passed to the top network, where learning continues as before. Learning in the bottom network (after activation of the goal concept) is randomly intermixed with learning in the top network. The net result of this learning history is that the broad cause ends up being activated more often when the higher order goal is present than when it is not, resulting in stronger connec- tion weights in the top network between the broad cause and the three facts.
To simulate the results of the second study with a feedforward network, I ran the multiple facts conditions again, but now in two versions reflecting either the presence or the absence of the higher order goal. Thus I assumed that participants had roughly the same pool of memories built up from various health-related histories, and that they, depending on the scenarios read, retrieved a somewhat different memory developed from different learning histories, either one in which the higher goal was present (e.g., knowledge about an explicitly desired pregnancy) or another in which the higher goal was absent (e.g., knowledge about pregnancies in general). The same frequencies for causes and facts were used for both versions (see Method section), with the major difference that in the higher order goal version, the goal was 10 times activated and was always followed by the broad cause (see bottom line of Table 1 ). Figure 5 depicts the simulation results of the ECHO network (middle panel) and of the feedforward network (bottom panel). Although the ECHO simulation attained a high summary fit (r = .893), there was again an anomaly due to the separate simulation of single and conjoint explanations. Although the broad explanation was better in the presence of a higher order explanation, consistent with the principle of being explained, this was so only when the narrow and broad explanations were simulated (left side). When the broad and conjoint explanations were simulated (right side), the reverse pattern was observed, contradicting the principle of being explained.
In contrast, the feedforward simulations nicely repliCated the pattern of results of Read and Marcus-Newhall. In addition, the summary fit was high (r = .872). Consistent with the principle of being explained by a higher order cause, the broad explanation was stronger when it was further explained by another goal explanation than when it was not. This difference was highly significant, t(78) = 16.53, p = 0. As noted above, the feedforward mechanism responsible for this effect is that in the higher order goal version, the broad cause was more often activated together with the events (due to the additional growing activation received from the higher order goal), so that it developed stronger connections with the output nodes.
Simulation of Competition (Study 3)
Predictions and human data. The principle of competition specifies that the evaluation of an explanation is comparative in that the judged explanatory strength is partially influenced by the availability of alternative explanations. Specifically, if there are several good explanations, then the goodness of the target explanation should be lowered. Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993, Study 3) tested this principle by asking half of their participants to rate all the single, broad, and conjoint explanations after reading multiple facts scenarios, whereas the other participants rated the same explanations with the exception of the broad explanation. Consistent with the principle of competition, it was found that the other explanations received lower ratings when the broad explanation was present than when it was absent (see Figure 6 , top panel).
Simulations. To simulate the results of Read and Marcus-
Newhall's (1993) Study 3, I assumed that the participants had built up about the same health-related memories and, depending on the explanations given, retrieved a different memory (based on different learning histories), either one in which the broad cause was absent (e.g., about illness and fitness) or one in which the broad cause was present (e.g., about pregnancy). Thus I ran the network with the same multiple facts condition as before, either with or without pregnancy as a cause. Figure 6 depicts the simulation results of the ECHO (middle panel) and feedforward network (bottom panel). As can be Explanation ts(78) = 12.05-12.32, ps = 0, as well as for the conjoint explanation, t(78) = 4.14, p < .0001. The mechanism responsible for the feedforward simulation result is that the output activation (i.e., the effect predicted by the network) is determined by the weighted sum of all activated input nodes (i.e., all explanations present). However, the teaching activation is limited to one for each event. Hence, as noted earlier, when several causes are jointly present and followed by the event, they must compete for the available activation. This reduces their upward adjustment during learning and may even turn them downward when the presence of the event is overesti- seen, consistent with the competition principle, in both simulations the narrow and conjoint explanations were weaker when the broad explanation was present than when it was not. Both networks attained high summary fits (r = .833 and .828, respectively). As can be seen, the ECHO network overestimated the predicted difference in the narrow and conjoint explanations relative to the human data, whereas the feedforward network fit the data better. In the feedforward simulations, the predicted increase of explanatory strength in the absence of the broad explanation was highly reliable for all narrow explanations, mated. Thus, when a narrow or conjoint cause is experienced together with the broad cause, competition between them arises, and the adjustment of the connections is slowed down or reversed. In contrast, when a narrow or conjoint cause is experienced alone, it can develop stronger connections without interference from the broad cause.
Robustness of the Simulations
To verify whether the present simulation results can be generalized beyond the present architecture and parameter values, I ran several variations of my simulations on all three of Read and Marcus-Newhall's studies. Given the same architecture (and the same parameter values except noted otherwise), I first lowered the amount of covariation for individual causes by 20% to add some realism to the simulations; second, I varied the frequency of the causes by doubling their occurrence (best fitting learning rate, e = .05); and third, I minimized order effects by coding absent causes not with zero activation as is customary, but with a negative activation level as suggested by Van Hamme and Wasserman (1994; best fitting learning rate, e = .10; and negative activation, aj~n _-_.30). None of these variations altered the simulations meaningfully (changes in fit r varied between -.017 and +.020).
In addition, I omitted the conjunctions (except the conjoint of the narrow explanations) from the architecture to assess their relevance. However, this eliminated the predicted effect of competition on the conjoint explanation and even reversed it. This is not surprising, as omitting relevant nodes and connections leaves less opponents against which the conjoint explanation must compete for available strength, so that the competition effect may disappear.
In summary, it seems that the present simulation results can be generalized to other frequencies and other levels of covariation (as long as their relative weight is preserved) and to another version of the delta algorithm that is more immune to order effects (Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994) , but not when omitting most conjunctions from the configural-cue architecture (Gluck & Bower, 1988a) .
Discussion
The results of the simulations are straightforward. For all four principles of coherence, the feedforward network was able to mimic the predicted effects. Although the simulation results did not replicate the human data from Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) perfectly, the results were generally at least as good as those of the ECHO constraint satisfaction network. Hence, it can be concluded that the feedforward perspective provides a valid alternative for the principles of coherence in social explanation.
During the past several years, we have witnessed a rising interest in connectionist models for explaining social phenomena (see Smith, 1996) . Like many researchers, my enthusiasm in applying these novel models of memory and thinking on social cognition and behavior was sparked by Read and MarcusNewhall's (1993) seminal work. After a first pioneering period of excitement and exploration, it has perhaps become time to pause, look back at what has been accomplished in the field, and evaluate whether research is on the right track. No doubt, connectionist models can account for some complex human judgments on the basis of very simple adjustment algorithms. The constraint satisfaction approach may provide some fundamental insights and contributions in the field, including an understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying pattern completion, schematic processing, memory reconstruction, and so on (Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986) .
However, on the basis of the present mathematical analysis and simulations, I believe that its contribution cannot lie in causal judgments, at least not in the format of ECHO as proposed by Thagard ( 1989b Thagard ( , 1992 and Read and Marcus-Newhall ( 1993 ) . This is because ECHO in this format shows some basic shortcomings, such as a lack of sensitivity to covariation and an inability to develop causal connections by experience. It needs to be seen whether incorporating a learning algorithm in future versions of ECHO would eliminate these limitations. I doubt it, because it seems useful only to incorporate learning after ECHO has settled in a stable activation state (because the present feedforward simulations show that providing a delta learning algorithm prior to the operation of ECHO makes ECHO itself superfluous). However, even then the question remains whether this post hoc learning algorithm would exhibit sensitivity to covariation, and how it can account for the prior acquisition of causal connections. It is apparent that Thagard's ( 1989b Thagard's ( , 1992 theory of explanatory coherence, on which ECHO is based, needs a major reformulation before it can effectively answer these questions.
As a consequence, I propose an entirely different, feedforward connectionist model that shows more promise for several reasons. First, the feedforward model is typically implemented with the delta algorithm, which allows it to learn from exposures to causes and their effects. Second, this algorithm is susceptible to covariation given appropriate encoding specifications (Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Van Overwalle, 1996) . Hence, the feedforward approach does not require arbitrary assumptions about the strength of diverse explanations on the basis of prior ratings of participants or good sense, as is the case in the ECHO simulations. Rather, assumptions are made only about the frequency of causes and their co-occurrence with the effect, which are natural and logically plausible (e.g., the joint occurrence of many causes is less probable than their individual occurrence; and broad causes covary less often with specific target effects than narrow causes). Third, as demonstrated in this article, the feedforward model can model the four principles of coherence explored by Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) . Finally, as a more general point, feedforward models implemented with the delta algorithm seem to represent a broad theory of learning, not only of causal learning, but also of animal conditioning (e.g., Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) and of human categorization and causality (see Allen, 1993; Shanks, 1993) .
Earlier, I argued that feedforward networks may perhaps encompass causal learning not only from actual experiences but also from reasoning, as both types of learning basically involve adjustments of prior beliefs. This position is based on pioneering work by Shanks (1991b) and Van Overwalle and Van Rooy (in press) , in which they demonstrated that people make very similar causal judgments from brief verbal summary descriptions as they do from sequential exposures to cause-effect co-occur-rences. However, an alternative explanation for this correspondence is that people created causal meta-beliefs or schemata about how causes interact with events on the basis of actual experiences and used these schemata to analyze summary descriptions. This is an exciting question for future research, especially for social psychologists, because it may shed some light on the link between causal processes at a lower associative level in personal cognition on the one hand, and at a higher symbolic level in social communication, arguing, and reasoning on the other hand.
investigating. However, as Chi (1989) pointed out, in this respect ECHO may exhibit implausible superhuman capabilities. In the behavioral decision-making literature, it has been consistently found that simple combinations of evidence are better at predicting human decisions, indicating that humans excel at evaluating a small amount of individual pieces of evidence, but are extremely poor at integrating multiple pieces of evidence in parallel as assumed by ECHO.
Implications for Other Domains of Social Cognition
Limitations of Feedforward Networks With Delta Learning
The accomplishments of the feedforward network model in various domains should not obscure the fact that the delta algorithm represents an idealized primitive form of learning, which should be augmented with additional processing features to deal with some more complicated phenomena and unresolved questions (see also Miller, Barnet, & Grahame, 1995) . To illustrate, there is no agreement on how organisms represent and learn conjunctions and how they should be represented in feedforward connectionist networks. (As we saw earlier, this was even more problematic for ECHO). Some researchers have argued that each conjunction is represented as a separate entity, like individual causes are (in exemplar-based models; e.g., Estes, 1994; Gluck & Bower, 1988a; Kruschke, 1992; Pearce, 1994) , whereas other researchers have assumed that the relationship between concurrent input cues are learned during prior processing (in recurrent or autoassociative network models; e.g., Smith & DeCoster, in press ).
Another question is how causal knowledge structures are best represented. To facilitate a direct comparison with ECHO, I used in my simulations a simple localist encoding scheme in which each concept is represented by a single node. However, this encoding requires that participants construct and retrieve different knowledge structures to reflect a slight difference in learning history (e.g., with or without a higher order goal). This may result in a proliferation of memory structures that is very inefficient. It seems biologically more plausible to assume that participants were accessing different parts of the same structure. This might be accomplished by a distributed representation Smith, 1996; Thorpe, 1994) in which some nodes represent microfeatures of unique learning histories, whereas other nodes represent common (or even generic) microfeatures. However, distributed modeling has almost never been applied in theory and research on causality and categorization until today, and it may vastly complicate the structure and dynamics of the network. For example, Van Overwalle and Van Rooy (in press ) demonstrated that the generalized delta algorithm (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988) , which can in principle deal with distributed encoding, is too slow to account for human causality judgments. An adequate answer to these representational questions will ultimately decide whether feedforward connectionist models can fulfill their initial promise as a theoretical device.
Another question is how well a feedforward network might perform on the kind of large scale structures such as legal arguing and scientific reasoning that Thagard ( 1989b Thagard ( , 1992 ) was ECHO's shortcomings have important implications for other models of social cognition that are built on constraint satisfaction principles. For example, Kunda and Thagard (1996) recently proposed a constraint satisfaction theory of impression formation that is identical to ECHO, and that thus also lacks a learning mechanism (see p. 308). Moreover, because it has been documented that trait attributions are based on the perceived covariation between the actor or object and their behavior (Hilton, Smith, & Kim, 1995; Van Overwalle, 1997 ), it appears that sensitivity to covariation should be a minimal requirement for any model of person perception, a requirement that is not fulfilled in Kunda and Thagard's model either. This latter limitation is not true of another, more complex constraint satisfaction model of cognitive dissonance proposed by Shultz and Lepper (1996) , although their model still lacks a learning mechanism that might account for more permanent changes in attitudes and dissonance reduction.
In contrast, learning is incorporated in the recurrent or autoassociative network model applied by Smith and DeCoster (in press ) to account for generalization processes in person perception and stereotyping. Like ECHO, this model accumulates excitatory and inhibitory activation to the most active nodes, but it also has a delta learning algorithm that enables it to reproduce stimulus patterns given at input, to reconstruct incomplete patterns, and to learn new emergent characteristics. It also uses a distributed representation of information and knowledge. However, because the goal of this network was not to mimic causal explanations, it is not immediately apparent whether it can be easily extended to deal with causal processes as well.
Conclusion
I have proposed that causal explanation should be viewed as a learning process. By learning I mean determining how causes and effects relate to each other by anticipating when and how much of the effect will appear when causes arise, and by finetuning this prediction. It appears that the classical principles of attribution and the novel principles of explanatory coherence are a natural and straightforward consequence of this delicate adjustment process. 
ECHO Is Insensitive to Covariation
Simulations
In the following simulations, I illustrate that ECHO (Thagard, 1992) cannot detect true cause-effect covariation even in the most simple case of one single cause and one single effect. Conventionally, identification of covariation between a causal hypothesis (H) and an effect involves four types of evidence corresponding to cells a to d in the contingency table of Figure A1 . One axis in the figure represents the presence and absence of the hypothesized cause, and the other axis the presence and absence of the effect. The causal strength (S) of explanation H is expressed in probabilistic terms by the following formulation (Allen, 1993; Cheng & Novick, 1990) :
where P[H] denotes the probability of the effect if cause H is present, and P [ ~H ] denotes the same probability if cause H is absent, and where fa-d represent the frequencies of the respective trial types. As noted earlier, Chapman and Robbins (1990) and Van Overwalle (1996) demonstrated mathematically that feedforward models using the delta algorithm can converge in asymptote to this probabilistic equation. If the ECHO model would also converge in asymptote to this probabilis-• tic norm, it would also be susceptible to cause-effect covariation. However, as I demonstrate below, it fails to do so. Figure A2 depicts how the four trial types (a-d) for the identification of covariation can be represented in ECHO. Each trial type is represented by a different type of evidence node (A, B, C, & D respectively), and the causal hypothesis is represented by an explanatory node (node H). For simplicity, the figure shows only one occurrence of each trial type; data nodes can be replicated for additional occurrences (e.g., multiple nodes B2, B3, and so on, with frequency fb, and so on).
In ECHO, evidence nodes are linked to a special evidence unit (node S) that is clamped at an activation of + 1 to indicate that the data have a special degree of credibility or strength. Given that trial types a and (Thagard, 1992, p. 81) . I ran several simulations of ECHO in which I started with some simplifying assumptions about parameter values that were then gradually relaxed. First, to obtain clear-cut results, I began the simulations without a decay parameter, which tends to attenuate the growth of the activations. Second, because there are no special reasons for the default connection weights used in ECHO (except that they appear to work well; Thagard, 1992) , at the beginning I set all weights at the same absolute value of 0.05.
Given these above assumptions, the simulations showed that the explanatory node (H) often reached nonnormative activation levels. For instance, ECHO predicts an explanatory activation of 1.00 even when the covariation is negative (-.25, fb = 1, f~ = 1, fd = 3 ), zero (fa = 3, fc = 2), or only weakly positive (.17, f~ = 2, fb = 1, fc = 1, fd = 1). Comparable results were obtained when ECHO's default weights and decay value were used. In sum, for various simulations and under very different parameter assumptions, ECHO was not susceptible to the true covariation between cause and effect. This failure is due, among other things, to the fact that ECHO cannot distinguish between the different types of confirmatory evidence (nodes A vs. B) and disconfirmatory evidence (nodes B vs. C), although this distinction is essential in calculating normative covariation (see Equation A1 ).
Mathematical Demonstration
In this section I extend the previous simulations with a mathematical demonstration of the activation level for a single explanatory node (H) as predicted by ECHO. I show that the explanatory activation is either equal to the relative difference between the frequencies of confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence, or (f~ + fd -fb --fc)/(fa + fa + fb + f~), whenever the amount of confirmatory evidence is smaller than that of the disconfirmatory evidence, or is + 1 otherwise. This is demonstrated given the simplifying assumptions that there is no decay term (decay = 0) and that all weights are equal in absolute terms (d = e = -i).
In their analysis of social explanations, Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) ran model simulations with Thagard's (1992) ECHO program by using, instead of the standard McClelland and Rumelhart algorithm (1988, p. 13 ), a variant known as the Grossberg algorithm (p. 17). A1 Figure A1 . A contingency table involving a hypothesized cause H. The a and d ceils denote confirmatory evidence; the b and c cells denote disconfirmatory evidence. AI Technically, the term constraint satisfaction is a bit confusing, because the model used by Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) and Thagard (1992) was defined by McClelland and Rumelhart (1988) as an "interactive activation and competition" model (p. 11 ). The Grossberg Rule
Speci al Evi dence unitdS//~ d Evi dence nodes A(~! ~~)~D
Expl anat ory eA~ E Figure A2 . An ECHO implementation of the contingency table in Figure A1 . Weights are denoted by d for data excitatory weights, e for excitatory weights, and i for inhibitory weights.
The Grossberg formulation specifies that the change in the activation of a node (or Aaj) is determined by the following equation (Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993, p. 440) : Aaj = enetj (max -aj) + inetj (aj -min) -(decay) aj, (A2) where decay is the decay parameter, enetj is the net excitatory input, and inetj is the net inhibitory input. The net input is determined by the summed activation of all nodes i linked to node j, in proportion to the weight (wij) of the link between nodes i and j. Specifically, enetj = 5". wija~ for w~j > 0, and inetj = E w0a~ for w U < 0. The parameter min is the minimum activation possible ( -1 ), and max is the maximum activation possible ( + 1 ). Updating stops when the activation of all nodes reaches asymptote, that is, when for all nodes Aaj = 0. Let us first examine how confirmatory evidence nodes axe updated. Because each node A is linked by means of positive weights to the special unit S and the explanatory node H, the Grossberg algorithm (see Equation  A2 ) specifies that the activation of node A is updated as follows: Aa^ = as d(1 -a^) + a. e(1 -ak).
A similar logic applies for the updating of the other nodes. Each disconfirmatory node B, which has a positive link with the special evidence unit S and a negative link with the explanatory node H, is updated as follows: used by Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) is a variant of this latter type of model (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988) . What McClelland and Rumelhart labeled as constraint satisfaction models is a special category of these interactive activation and competition models, with the most important characteristic being that the minimum equals zero and that a bias term is added to the net input. However, to avoid any confusion, I use the term constraint satisfaction in the sense given by Read and Marcus-Newhall. One can find what the asymptotic activations are by setting AaA, AaB, and ^an from Equations A3 through A5 to 0. I began by setting Equation A3 for the confirmatory node A to zero. Because as = 1, this resulted in two solutions: aA = 1 or aH= -d/e.
Similarly', to find the asymptotic activation of the disconfirming node B, I set Equation A4 equal to zero. Given that as = 1, and after rearranging terms, this yielded:
Note that substituting the second solution an = -die of Equation A6 into Equation A7 may sometimes lead to unacceptable results (divisions by zero), for instance, when d = e = -i. Therefore, this solution must be rejected, which yielded the following: aA = 1.
An important feature of constraint satisfaction models is that activation levels that exceed the maximum activation (max) are cut off at that level. A2 Consequently, when au -< 0, aa will tend to grow above 1 but wilt be restricted to the maximum level. Thus, if a. < 0, then aB = 1.
Exactly the same reasoning and results apply for the other confirmatory nodes Di and disconfirmatory nodes Ci, and I therefore do not repeat them here. Finally, to find the asymptotic activation of the explanatory node H, I set Equation A5 equal to zero. After substituting for ag and aD (in Equation A8 ) and for as and ac (in Equation A9), and rearranging terms, I found
(f~ + fa)e + (fb + f~)i as = (A10) (f~ + fa)e -(fb + f¢)i
Making the simplifying assumption that e = -i, I obtained:
A+A-fb-A aH f~ +fd +fb +f~ ' (All) indicating that the activation of the explanatory node is determined by the relative difference of the confirmatory versus disconfirmatory frequencies. It is immediately obvious that this formulation is different from Equation A1, indicating that an will normally not reach normative values.
To find the asymptotic activation of the explanatory node H given that an > 0, the value of as given in Equation A7 can be directly substituted in Equation A5 (because aB will remain below maximum activation level) together with the value of a^ in Equation A8. After setting Equation Making the simplifying assumption that d = -i, this reduces to a~ = 1, so that either an = 1 or aa = -1. However, substituting solution A2 This was not explicitly mentioned by Thagard (1992) or Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993) , but is customary for interactive activation and competition models (see McClelland & Rumelhart, 1988, p. 23) and was also found to be incorporated in the ECHO computer program. aH = -1 in Equation A7 for the activation of B yields an unacceptable solution (division by zero), so that the only possible solution is aH= 1.
Substituting this result in Equation A7 yields aB = 0.
To conclude, given the present parameter assumptions, ECHO will always converge to the explanatory activation value of + 1 whenever the confirmatory frequencies are larger than the disconfirmatory frequencies; otherwise the explanatory activation is given by the relative difference between confirmatory and disconfirmatory frequencies (see Equation  A11 ). None of these activation levels is close to the normative formulation of covariation given in Equation A1.
